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ABSTRACT 
 
Bolivia is a producer and the main exporter of natural gas in the South American market. 
The role of Bolivia as a natural gas provider to Brazil and Argentina has recently been 
put into question. Lagging investments in exploration, partially caused by the 
hydrocarbon fiscal regime changes that favor the government, has resulted in no major 
discoveries in the past decade. Current reserves and production are concentrated in three 
gas-condensate naturally fractured mega-fields in the Southern Sub-Andean province, 
with two of them producing for more than 15 years. 
The aim of this study is to quantify the impact of the past legislation modifications on 
the allocation of cash flow streams to the government and the contractor, and evaluate 
the feasibility of future drilling activities in a representative mega-field under the 2015 
Hydrocarbon Incentives Law that aims to prevent the looming natural gas supply and 
demand gap. A review of the profitability of Bolivia’s current hydrocarbon extraction 
arrangements is useful in order to be able to forecast likely future revenue streams. This 
study briefly outlines the development of the regional gas trade and then proceeds to 
outline the architecture of the principal cash flows generated by the case study. The 
concurrent profitability of existing field operations is analyzed from the perspective of 
both the operator and the state with a range of outcomes depending on a sensitivity 
analysis of the regional gas price development, under various fiscal regimes and 
contractual arrangements. The actual optimum rate of monetization of these remaining 
hydrocarbon reserves in Bolivia will be affected by a requirement of attractive return on 
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investment considering various gas prices and demand scenarios, as determined by 
competitive shale gas development in Argentina, offshore gas in Brazil, and LNG 
imports.   
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Scene Setting 
Bolivia is one of the most important natural gas producers and exporters in South 
America. The revenues from hydrocarbon sales to Argentina and Brazil converted 
Bolivia into the main external provider for these countries, and enabled unprecedented 
economic growth in Bolivia. Over the past two decades, high prices of commodities, 
growing demand from the exportation markets and hydrocarbon legislation 
modifications have allowed natural gas production to be a key contributor to the national 
economy. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has almost tripled in one decade (Figure 1) 
and the Foreign-Exchange Reserves increased from $3 billion in 2006 to $15 billion in 
2014 (MEF, 2016).   
 
Figure 1. Nominal GDP of Bolivia and WTI oil prices (Adapted from MEF, 2016) 
 
Bolivia gas exports to Brazil and Argentina occur under 20-year contracts. The gas sale 
agreement with Brazil expires in 2019 (Appendix A1) and the agreement with Argentina 
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lasts until 2027 (Appendix A2). Gas deliveries are priced through an agreed base price 
indexed to crude oil that allows for price escalation when the index commodity price 
changes. Bolivia has been able to use the revenues from gas exports to maintain the high 
levels of revenues which finance social programs and provide considerable to provinces, 
municipal governments, public universities and other state institutions. However, the 
country developed a fiscal deficit in 2014, due to a decline in hydrocarbon revenues 
(IMF, 2014). Capital markets were tapped for government bonds in 2012 for the first 
time since 1920 (IMF, 2014). 
 
Figure 2. Exports of Bolivia by economic activity (Adapted from MEF, 2016) 
. 
1.2   Problem Statement 
Major contributions to GDP growth in Bolivia came from exportation of minerals and 
hydrocarbons (Figure 2). The historic economic growth of Bolivia was partially enabled 
by the long-term gas contracts with Brazil and later with Argentina, the change of 
hydrocarbon legislation in 2005 and 2006 that increased the revenue share of the 
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government, and a period of favorable prices of commodities. These factors have 
recently varied: the contract with Brazil ends in 2019 with uncertainty of the terms of a 
possible contract renewal, the commodity boom that fueled the flourishing Bolivian 
economy showed signs of slowing down in 2015, and the fiscal regime strong taxing has 
impacted investments in exploration and production (E&P). 
E&P investments have fluctuated over the past two decades but were mainly allocated to 
production and to a lesser extent, exploration activities (Figure 3a). As a result of 
lagging exploration investments, the natural gas reserves of Bolivia have steadily 
declined since the early exploration boom in the 1990’s with reserves peaking in 2000-
2005 (Figure 3b). The exploration contracts signed after the hydrocarbon fiscal regime 
modifications in 2005 and 2006 were not successful or haven’t started drilling activities. 
  
Figure 3. (a) Bolivian E&P investments and (b) natural gas proved reserves 
(Adapted from YPFB, 2014) 
 
Bolivia’s ability to meet the domestic and foreign gas demand has raised concerns. In 
June 2016, Bolivia could not comply with the contractual gas volumes agreed to 
Argentina. In turn, Argentina had to import natural gas from Chile to fill the supply and 
demand gap during the winter season of 2016. Looking towards the future, Chavez-
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Rodriguez et al. (2016) predicts that Bolivia will have to develop all reserves, contingent 
resources and some yet-to-find resources to meet the demand. Chavez-Rodriguez et al 
(2016) estimates that a $20 billion investment is required to develop the resources 
necessary to comply with the demand in the period 2015-2030. In parallel, a study by the 
National Industry Confederation of Brazil (CNI, 2016a) suggests that between $5.4 and 
$7.1 billion investment in exploration would guarantee enough gas for the domestic 
market and foreign exports in the period 2015-2026. 
What is now at stake for Bolivia is the need to stimulate E&P investments in its 
hydrocarbon sector to turn around the decade-long decline in Reserves/Production (R/P) 
ratios and comply with the gas export agreements. In 2015, the Bolivian government 
approved the Law of Incentives 707 which rewards exploration and exploitation 
activities to increase the production of oil and condensate. This law aims to accelerate 
hydrocarbon exploration to find new resources and increase the production in existing 
fields. Current production and remaining reserves are concentrated in gas-condensate 
naturally fractured mega-fields in the Southern Sub-Andean province: San Alberto, 
Sabalo and Margarita. YPFB (2014b) Strategic Plan scheduled 3 production wells drilled 
in San Alberto, 4 in Sabalo and 3 in Margarita in the period 2015-2019.  
A review of the profitability of the Bolivia’s current hydrocarbon extraction 
arrangements is useful for forecasting likely future revenue streams and the feasibility of 
drilling activities accounting for the incentives. The rate of monetization of the 
hydrocarbon resources in Bolivia will be affected by a requirement of attractive returns 
on investment, taking into account regional gas price and demand scenarios, as 
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determined by competitive shale gas development in Argentina, offshore gas in Brazil, 
and price levels of potential LNG imports. This study uses historic production data of a 
representative Bolivian mega-field to develop a production forecast model which is 
coupled with an economic analysis under various price scenarios. This analysis includes, 
but is not limited to, seeking answers to: 
 What was the impact of the change in hydrocarbon legislation in revenue 
distribution?  
 Are current and future operations profitable for the oil company under the current 
fiscal regime in the studied field? 
 What is the proportion of future profits that ultimately go the government and the 
oil company under different price scenarios? 
 What is the impact of the incentives law in the project’s profitability? 
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CHAPTER II  
REVIEW OF THE BOLIVIAN GAS VALUE CHAIN 
The Bolivian gas value chain is made up of a number of unique elements that govern 
resource development, fiscal systems, profitability and market dynamics. First, the value 
chain can be stimulated by fiscal incentives commensurate with geological risk (and 
other risk premium requirements) to attract E&P investments that could cause an 
upstream revival of gas production (Weijermars 2016).  Second, the regional gas market 
develops according to supply and demand trends as the outcome not only of Bolivian 
resource development policies and investments, but also of its partners (Argentina and 
Brazil). Third, the regional market is influenced by global commodity price 
developments, partly due to increasing liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports in Brazil and 
Argentina, and partly due to oil indexing of the existing gas pricing mechanism in 
Bolivia.  This chapter first contains a literature review and a review of the key elements 
of the Bolivian gas value chain to provide a basis for further analysis. 
2.1 Literature Review: Regional Gas Markets 
As of December 2015, South and Central America held 4.1% of the global natural gas 
proved reserves and accounted for 5% of the global gas production (BP, 2016). 
Venezuela is the major holder of proved gas reserves in South America, followed by 
Brazil, Peru, Argentina and Bolivia (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Natural gas proved reserves in South & Central America (Adapted from 
BP, 2016) 
 
In terms of natural gas production, Argentina leads in the region, followed by 
Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru. However, the three largest producers use natural 
gas for domestic consumption only. Additionally, Argentina and Brazil import gas 
through pipeline and LNG cargoes.    
The South American gas market is characterized by a low regional integration which 
results from technical difficulties that hinder new projects, the perception that it is not a 
priority, and the complex political relations within and between the involved countries 
(KAS, 2016). The most successful efforts have been the construction of pipelines 
integrating Bolivia and Brazil, Bolivia and Argentina, Argentina and Chile, and to a 
lesser extent Colombia and Venezuela. 
The first cross-border pipeline in the Southern Cone was built in 1972 connecting 
Bolivia and Argentina. During the late 90’s and early 2000’s, seven pipelines were built 
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between Argentina and Chile. In 1996, Brazil and Bolivia agreed to build a pipeline and 
sales to Brazil started in 1999 as part of a long-term contract. In the Northern Cone, a 
pipeline connects Colombia and Venezuela. The agreement for gas sales from Colombia 
to Venezuela started in 2007 and ended in 2015 (Honore, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 5. Gas trade in South America in 2014 in billion cubic meters per annum  
(Adapted from KAS 2016) 
 
Currently, Bolivia is the major exporter of natural gas within the region, providing gas to 
Brazil and Argentina under long-term agreements. Peru is also a net exporter of natural 
gas that uses a LNG liquefaction terminal to trade it in the Pacific market (Figure 5).  
Although historically isolated, the regional gas market in South America has been 
changing its focus from self-sufficiency and regional integration to building 
infrastructure for imports and opening to the LNG market. Eight regasification plants 
were built in the last decade (Table 1).  
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Table 1. LNG tegasification plants in South America (Adapted from Honore 2016) 
Country Plant Start-up year Capacity (bcma) 
Chile 
Quintero 2009 5.5 
Mejillones 2010 2 
Argentina 
Bahia Blanca 2008 5.1 
Escobar 2011 5.1 
Brazil 
Pecem 2008 2.5 
Guanabara 2009 8.1 
Bahia Blanca 2014 5.2 
 
However, the diversification of supply sources is not limited to LNG imports. New 
discoveries in the pre-salt area in Brazil and the rise of unconventional resources 
exploitation are expected to substantially increase the regional natural gas supply. 
According to a report from the U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA 2012), 
Argentina holds the second largest shale gas resources in the world with 802 TCF of 
technically recoverable gas. The rest of the countries in the region also have abundant 
unconventional resource potential as seen in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6. Technically recoverable shale gas in South America (Adapted from EIA, 
2013) 
 
This new scenario of an over-supplied market suggests intense competition between 
LNG and pipeline supplies in the near future (Wood 2016). In addition, unconventional 
gas will have a big impact in various markets and question the indexation of gas prices 
to oil (Reymond 2012). 
2.2 Bolivian Gas Market Development 
Hydrocarbon production in Bolivia is dependent on a relatively small number of fields 
located in the Southern Sub-Andean province: Sabalo, San Alberto and 
Margarita/Huacaya. These fields have similar characteristics: naturally-fractured gas-
condensate reservoirs that target the Early Devonian formations (Huamampampa, Icla 
and Santa Rosa).  
In 2016, the mega-fields represented 75% of the production of natural gas (MEH 2016). 
San Alberto and Sabalo have been producing for more than 15 years and their imminent 
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decline could result in difficulties complying with existing natural gas delivery 
commitments. Nevertheless, the mega-fields are responsible for a large share of the 
national production of both natural gas and condensate in the coming years. Based on 
estimated decline rates made by YPFB (2014b) in their 5-year Corporation Strategy Plan 
2015-2019, the mega-fields will still be relevant in the following years (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7. Forecast of natural gas production per field, 2015-2019 (Adapted from 
YPFB, 2014b) 
 
The current decrease of reserves and production could potentially result in failure to 
satisfy contractual obligations to supply domestic and foreign markets. Such a decline 
also hinders the negotiations of a new gas sale contract with Brazil given that the current 
one ends in 2019. The last time Bolivian hydrocarbon reserves were certified (2013), 
proved natural gas reserves were 10.45 TCF (YPFB, 2014a). This volume seems 
insufficient to comply with the demand of a new contract with similar volumes as the 
current gas sale agreement with Brazil, considering the other prevalent contractual 
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obligations and the growing domestic demand. The investments in hydrocarbon 
exploration have not been adequate to replace the produced reserves due in part to a 
perceived lack of legal security in the country, and an unfavorable fiscal system for 
International Oil Companies (IOC) after the legislation changes and the nationalization 
of hydrocarbons in 2005-2006. 
Looking back, investments in exploration and exploitation started rising in 1997 (Fig. 
3a), which led to the discovery of new reserves in the year 2000 (Fig. 3b). The initial 
investment boom was associated with the contract signed between YPFB and Petrobras 
for the supply of natural gas for 20 years to the Brazilian market, starting in 1999. A 
favorable investment environment was created by Hydrocarbon Law 1689 issued in 
1996, which reduced the royalties to hydrocarbon discoveries after its issuance from 
50% to 18%. In addition, the contractor benefited from a new concessionary system, an 
environment that facilitated the marketing of hydrocarbons, and the participation of 
foreign companies in transportation, distribution and industrialization activities (Perrault 
and Valdivia 2010). Subsequently, investments decreased and reached a low point in 
2005-2007 because the contractors were averse to increasing investments after the 
contract with Brazil was consolidated, and the obligation to drill one well per parcel was 
annulled in 2001 by the Decree Supreme 26366 (Paz and Ramirez 2013). In this period, 
the new Hydrocarbon Law 3058 and the Decree Supreme 28701 were issued. The new 
fiscal regime increased state participation in the revenues of hydrocarbon sales by 
implementing a 32% direct tax on hydrocarbon production at the wellhead and requiring 
participation of the National Oil Company. The participation requirement remained 
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variable and was defined in a renegotiation of the contracts with the IOCs that were 
operating in Bolivia. In effect, the contracts migrated from a concessionary system to a 
mix of a production sharing system and a service contract. 
After 2007, E&P investments began rising again but were mostly directed to exploitation 
activities. In that period, the supply of natural gas to Argentina was initiated under a new 
20-year contract. With these investments, national gas production rose from nearly 40 
MMm3/d in 2007 to 59.6 MMm3/d in 2014 (YPFB, 2014a). 
The Bolivian government has made efforts to stop the decline of the R/P ratio and to 
prevent the reduction of the revenues coming from natural gas activities by promoting 
investments in E&P. In legislative matters, the National Congress issued the Law of 
Incentives 767 that rewards the production of oil and condensate. In addition, the 
government plans to execute more than 40% of the investments in exploration through 
YPFB (2014b) and its subsidiaries in 2015-2019. Nevertheless, the current low-price 
commodity environment after the oil price slum of since 2014 and the fixed gas prices in 
the growing domestic market have deterred foreign oil companies from investing on 
Bolivian exploration. Meanwhile, pressure remains high to find new reserves as the gas 
demand increases, and negotiations for contract renewal with Brazil are just around the 
corner. 
2.3 Brazilian Gas Market  
The Brazilian gas market has three main sources: imports via pipeline from Bolivia, 
domestic production and imports from LNG plants. As shown in Figure 8, more than 
 14 
 
50% of Brazil’s gas demand of this hydrocarbon has been covered by imports from 
Bolivia and by LNG cargoes in 2014 (EPE, 2016). 
 
Figure 8. Brazilian natural gas supply sources in 2014 (Adapted from EPE, 2016) 
 
The contract between Brazil and Bolivia for natural gas sales has a duration of 20 years 
with a maximum quantity of 30.08 MMm3/d. It was signed in 1996, and made effective 
in 1999 (YPFB, 1996). The contractual natural gas price depends on the prices of a 
basket of fuel oils, so it is linked to the price of oil (Appendix A.1). The contract ends in 
2019 and negotiations for a new deal have already started, but the conditions are rather 
different than 20 years ago: the Brazilian gas market is being decentralized allowing 
institutions and state distributors to participate in the supply chain, domestic production 
has steadily increased, and LNG regasification plants are now available. 
Brazil’s national oil company, Petrobras, has controlled almost all the natural gas supply 
chain.  However, recent changes aimed to decentralize the natural gas market. Brazil’s 
Law 11909 (2009) created three new categories of consumers: the free consumer, the 
self-importer, and the self-producer. Each consumer can buy, import or produce natural 
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gas for their own use. When state distributors cannot satisfy their needs, consumers can 
now independently build pipelines and infrastructure. Petrobras will no longer be the 
only actor.  
The domestic production of natural gas in Brazil has consistently increased. Between 
2005 and 2015, production almost doubled from 49 to 93 MMscfd (CNI 2016a). 
Nevertheless, only 49% to 68% of the total production has been available for the market 
in the past 10 years due to its common use for reinjection in offshore fields (CNI 2016a). 
Reinjection is especially prevalent in the Pre-Salt area where technical and economic 
challenges are faced: the producing fields are far from the shore and CO2 content in the 
gas is very high. Associated natural gas and carbon dioxide are reinjected to retain field 
pressure. 
Pre-Salt fields already accounted for a third of Brazil’s natural gas and oil production in 
2015, where the break-even price was round 45$/boe with an additional 5-7$ per barrel 
for transport and treatment of the natural gas (Honore 2016). Petrobras plans to gather 
Pre-Salt basin with three sub-marine pipelines: Routes 1, 2 and 3 with a combined 
capacity of 41 MMm3/d. Routed 1 and 2 began operating in 2011 and 2016, 
respectively. Route 3 is planned to start operating in 2018 with a capacity of 18 MMm3d 
(Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Gathering pipelines from Pre-Salt (Adapted from Petrobras 2014) 
 
Slow paced exploration activities in the Pre-Salt area are partly due to the requirement of 
Petrobras participation as an operator and a 30% share (KAS 2016). In addition, the 
fields are located 200 to 300 km away from the coast, at depths of 5000 to 6000 m. 
below the sea level and in ultra-deep waters of 1900 to 2400 m (Honore 2016). 
Onshore conventional production offers significant potential but lack of pipelines and 
distribution networks in these isolated areas remains a barrier for onshore development. 
In remote regions, one solution is using the gas for electricity generation, since electrical 
infrastructure is more developed throughout the country. There is also potential for the 
development of unconventional resources but rigorous environmental legislation and 
lack of infrastructure in the areas of interest have prevented such development (Gomes, 
2014). 
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Noteworthy, LNG imports are used to supply thermoelectricity plants when hydro 
supply becomes insufficient. Due to the seasonality of demand, LNG imports are 
negotiated in the spot market or in short-term contracts in 1-2 years with the main 
suppliers. However, they could start to play a bigger role in Brazil’s natural gas supply 
due to a greater regasification capacity, uncertainty on the reliability of imports coming 
from Bolivia, and a new scenario of favorable prices due to global oversupply and low 
oil prices.  
Brazil has three regasification plants with a joint capacity of 41MMm3d (Table 1): Rio 
de Janeiro (20), Ceara (7), and Bahia (14). A new terminal under construction in Rio 
Grande do Sul is expected to be functional in 2019 with a capacity of 19.5 MMm3d; 5.9 
MMm3/d will be used for electricity generation and the rest will be available for the 
market (EPE, 2014).  
In the future, domestic gas production in Brazil could reach 159 MMm3d in 2025, with 
approximately 72 MMm3d available for distribution in the natural gas market after 
reinjection use (CNI, 2016a). As for the demand, EPE (2014) foresees that demand will 
rise from 109 MMm3d in 2015 to 171 MMm3d in 2024. This means that natural gas 
imports will still be necessary, and may even increase if the planned thermoelectricity 
plants are built as expected.  
It can be concluded that imports will still play a major role in the supply of natural gas of    
Brazil in the next 10 years which represents a good scenario for a new gas sale contract 
with Bolivia. Petrobras (2014) envisaged to maintain the current contractual volumes of 
production in its 2030 Strategic Plan beyond the finalization of the current contract, with 
 18 
 
24 MMm3/d inflexible and 6MMm3/d flexible demand (Petrobras, 2014). However, 
since the efforts for the liberalization of its gas market in 2011, Brazil could reduce the 
gas quantities purchased from Petrobras by half and let state distributors negotiate their 
own contracts (El Diario, 2016).The state gas distributors and companies may not be 
able to sign long-term contracts with “Take or Pay” clauses which will result in higher 
volatility and a possible direct competition with LNG imports.  
On the other hand, the availability of Bolivian gas for a possible new contract with 
Brazil will depend on exploratory efforts which have been slow in the past years. Most 
investments have been allocated to exploitation and low-risk exploration in well-known 
areas. CNI (2016a) suggests that investments in explorations should round between 5.4 
and 7.1 billion dollars to guarantee enough gas for the domestic market, the 
petrochemical plants and the foreign exports in the period 2015-2026. 
2.4 Argentinian Gas Market 
Argentina has historically been a producer and consumer of natural gas, which had a 
share of approximately 50% of the total energy matrix in 2015. It is the largest gas 
market in South America (approximately 120 MMm3/d in 2015), accounting for 36% of 
the regional demand (Honore, 2016). In the past decade, a deficit in domestic production 
due to policies of artificial pricing has forced Argentina to import natural gas via 
pipeline from Bolivia and via LNG shipments, and to accelerate the development of 
unconventional gas resources. 
The natural gas supply contract between Bolivia and Argentina was signed in 2006 for a 
duration of 20 years (YPFB, 2006), with scaling volumes reaching a maximum quantity 
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of 27.7 MMm3/d by 2021 (Appendix A.2). The price determination method is based on 
the prices of a basket of fuel and diesel oils (Appendix A.2). These contracts include the 
“Take or Pay” and “Deliver or Pay” clauses, which state the obligation of selling and 
buying a stipulated minimum quantity of natural gas. The contractual volumes were 
modified in the Addendum signed in March 2010. Previously agreed volumes could not 
be met due to the delay of gas transportation infrastructure and the insufficient 
production in Bolivia (Ceppi, 2014). 
LNG imports are seasonal and the capacity of the regasification terminals in Bahia 
Blanca and Escobar (Table 1) is used during winter when domestic consumptions peaks. 
In contrast to Brazil, Argentina does not plan to expand its regasification capacity but it 
is trying to replace such imports with domestic produced gas. 
As for domestic production, the most promising formation is primarily the Vaca Muerta 
formation in the Neuquen Basin (Gomes and Brandt, 2016). Although most of the shale 
activity is focused on the oil-prone zone, shale gas resources are just as important: they 
are estimated to be 801.5 TCF for Argentinian (EIA, 2013). Exploration and early 
commercial programs are being developed, and more than 1,101 wells had been drilled 
by 2015. During that year, unconventional gas production was 235.5 bcf, accounting for 
15.5% of the total domestic production (Gomes and Brandt, 2016). Most of it comes 
from tight gas fields whose combined production reached 14.4 MMm3/d in 2015 and it 
continues to ramp up. This occurred because tight gas is more competitive than shale 
gas: the first has a producing cost in the range of 4.5-5 $/MMBTU while the latter has a 
cost range of 5-5.9$/MMBTU (Gomes and Brandt, 2016). 
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The Argentinian government has made efforts to provide price incentives for domestic 
production. The Gas Plan implemented by the government in January 2013 gives an 
incentive for gas projects of up to 7.5 $/MMBTU for additional production which is 
above the decline curve agreed between the government and the oil company. This plan 
has been extended for two additional years ending December 2019. However, the 
learning curve for unconventional resources exploitation is still steep and significant 
capital is required to develop these resources. Di Sbroiavacca (2013) proposes a scenario 
that $16 billion of investments are necessary to reach self-sufficiency in 2022. In a more 
conservative scenario, Di Sbroiavacca (2013) suggests that Argentina will still rely on 
imports until 2030. In parallel, the forecast made by the Oxford Institute of Energy 
Studies (Gomes and Brandt, 2016) estimates that 34 MMm3/d will still be needed from 
imports by 2027. 
2.5 Future Development of the Bolivian Gas Market 
The domestic gas market in Bolivia is directed to four types of consumers: residential, 
industrial, commercial, and thermoelectricity plants. In early 2017, total domestic natural 
gas consumption was around 12.5 MMm3/d (MHE, 2017) and it has maintained a 
growing trend in the past decade. The forecasts made by YPFB indicate a 7% demand 
increase for commercial and residential consumption, and a 5% increase for its use in 
thermoelectricity plants. This tendency is corroborated by Chavez-Rodriguez et al. 
(2016) who forecast an annual rate increase of 6.6% between 2012 and 2030. Growth in 
domestic demand could affect the feasibility of new projects since prices are fixed for 
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the domestic market. Some companies have already asked for a revision of the price 
determination method.  
Additionally, national policy gives priority to the industrialization of natural gas. This 
aims to maximize the economic and social benefits by investing in petrochemical plants 
such as a gas-to-liquid (GTL) Plant, ammonia, urea, and polyethylene, or providing 
natural gas to energy intensive projects such as the steel mega mine “Mutun”. However, 
the feasibility of these projects depends on the price of natural gas, which will most 
likely be lower than the prices paid by Argentina and Brazil. For instance, a YPFB 
feasibility study of the urea plant has shown a ROR of 18.14% with a price of 
$2.5/MMBTU, and it would take 11 years to recover the initial investment (CNI, 2016a). 
A larger share of subsidized prices would affect the stakeholders in exploitation 
activities.  
Domestic production of hydrocarbons can increase in both Argentina and Brazil which 
would result in a reduction of the imports from Bolivia. Argentina has an immense 
potential for developing unconventional oil and gas. On the other hand, Brazil has 
increased the production of associated gas from the offshore oil fields in the Pre-salt. 
Both countries face technical and economic challenges to developing these resources but 
in the medium term they could compete or replace the gas coming from Bolivia. It is 
worth remembering that the gas sale contracts with Brazil and Argentina end in 2019 
and 2027, respectively. 
LNG imports in the region have been increasing, Brazil and Argentina are not the 
exception. These countries have grown their regasification capacity. Currently, imports 
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via LNG shipments is seasonal: Argentina imports it in winter when the residential 
consumption peaks, and Brazil buys it for electricity generation when hydroelectric 
plants fail to fully supply the domestic demand. Prices of LNG have been getting more 
competitive, but gas coming from Bolivia is still the cheapest. 
2.6 Future Regional Gas Demand Scenarios for Bolivia’s Gas Price-Making 
An estimation of the demand scenarios is necessary to determine the likely future natural 
gas price, a key input for the economic analysis in Section 5. This price is impacted by 
the shares of the domestic and foreign natural gas market, since a weighted average of 
the natural gas prices is assumed (a growing domestic demand will lower the overall 
price due to its subsidized price). The demand scenarios can be balanced to the current 
fields’ production and shows when the gap between supply and demand is created. 
Low demand scenario. This scenario assumes an annual growth of 6.6% for the 
domestic gas demand according to a study by Chavez-Rodriguez et al (2016). For the 
Brazilian and Argentinian cases, the lowest contractual demand is assumed (Take or Pay 
quantities). For the period following the end of the contract with Brazil, a steady demand 
of 16 MMm3/d is assumed for that market (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Natural gas low demand scenario assuming “Take or Pay” quantities in 
the Brazil and Argentina contracts. A contract renewal for 16 MMm3/d is assumed 
for the Brazilian market after the current contract ends in 2020. 
 
High demand scenario. The domestic gas demand growth rate is the same as the low 
demand scenario plus 2.8 MMm3/d starting in 2018 assuming the installation of the 
planned polyethylene plant (2014b) Strategic Plan 2015-2019. As for the export markets, 
the maximum contractual gas delivery quantity is selected and maintained beyond the 
finalization of the contracts, assuming a contract renewal with the same characteristics 
(Figure 11)   
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Figure 11. Natural gas high demand scenario: Assuming the installation of the 
polyethylene plant in Bolivia and the maximum contractual volumes for Brazil and 
Argentina with the renewal of the contracts after their finalization 
 
Comparing the demand scenarios to the supply of natural gas, a gap is seen to emerge 
from 2024 onward for the low demand scenario, and in 2020 for the high demand 
scenario (Figure 12). The assumptions of the natural gas supply are based on the studies 
made by CNI (2016a) and the expected decline of the existing producing fields made by 
YPFB (2014b). 
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Figure 12. Natural gas supply compared to demand scenarios: A gap between 
supply and demand can be seen in 2020 for the high demand scenario, and in 2024 
for the low demand scenario 
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CHAPTER III  
FIELD PRODUCTION ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTATIVE MEGA-FIELD 
In this section, a brief description of the geological setting, the discovery and 
development of the representative mega-field is provided for proper context. Then, a 
production forecast is performed using Decline Curve Analysis using historic production 
information. The outcome will be used as input for the economic evaluation and cash 
flow presented in Chapter 5. 
3.1 Geological Setting 
The studied field is located in the Sub-Andean zone of the Chaco basin in Bolivia. The 
basin comprises a 60-km long narrow anticline which begins in South East Bolivia and 
ends in Northern Argentina. The Chaco basin can be divided into four sub-provinces: the 
Sub-Andean Zone, the Foothill Belt, the Sub-Chaco basin and the Izozog high. USGS 
(2012) indicates that undiscovered natural gas in the area has a mean value of 26 TCF. 
Bolivia holds 80% of the reserves of the basin, Argentina holds 20% and Paraguay less 
than 1 % (Zhang et al., 2014) 
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Figure 13. Structural map of the Southern Sub-Andean Zone of Bolivia, circled in 
red the studied field (Adapted from Moretti et.al, 2000) 
 
The Sub-Andean Zone proper is a fold and thrust belt (Figure 13) with two major 
detachments, on the eastern margin of the Andes (Figure 14). The zone is characterized 
by north to north-northeast trending, narrow anticlines (Dunn et. al., 1995). Bolivian 
hydrocarbon potential is concentrated in this zone comprised of a series of anticline 
structures, the San Alberto field being a prime example (Mathewson and Bloor, 
1998).There are two petroleum systems in the Sub-Andean zone (Figure 14): the 
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Devonian shale as source rock and the Upper Devonian sands as reservoirs, and the 
Silurian and Lower Devonian as source rocks (Kirusillas and Icla Formations) and the 
lower Devonian sands as reservoirs (Moretti et al, 2002).  
 
Figure 14. Lithostratigraphic column of the Southern Sub-Andean province with 
main source rocks marked by vertical bars (Adapted from Moretti, 2000) 
 
Exploration and production technical challenges in the studied field are related to 
seismic acquisition and a rugged topography. The structures in the Sub-Andean are steep 
with dips close to 90 degrees and the area has up to 100-m cliffs, making it hard to 
access. These phenomena along with the poor signal-to-noise ratio contribute to one of 
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the major exploration problems in the zone: obtaining reliable seismic profiles (Ravaut 
et al. 2002). 
The lithology is comprised of hard rock with consistently low values of both porosity 
and permeability in all the mega-fields: matrix porosity of 5%, fracture porosity of 1%, 
and fracture permeability in the hundreds of milliDarcies (D’Arlach 2016).  
3.2 Development and Production History 
The studied field is a gas-condensate naturally fractured reservoir. OGIP was estimated 
to be 5.3 TCF (Soares 2000). The history of the field goes back to the 60’s and 70’s, 
when YPFB drilled eight wells and produced oil from the Miller formation, at depths of 
around 1000-2000 m. In 1990, based on further geological studies and discoveries in the 
Argentinian part of the structure, YPFB drilled a well and discovered a gas-condensate 
reservoir in the Huamampampa formation of the Early Devonian (4500 m. deep). 
In 1996, Petrobras Bolivia S.A signed a contract with YPFB for the San Alberto block. 
Petrobras drilled an additional well, targeting the Huamampampa, Icla and Santa Rosa 
formations. The results were positive and in 1999, YPFB approved the Declaration of 
Commerciality of the field.  Nine more wells were subsequently drilled (Table 2). 
3.3  Production Forecast 
Historic production data is available for the entire life of the field since the first 
production well came on stream in 2001 until 2016 (Figure 15) and on a per-well basis 
until 2012.  
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Figure 15. Production history for natural gas and condensate 
The ramp up in production lasted nearly 5 years and the plateau was reached in month 
78. The reduction in production outputs for months 98 to 109 correspond to the year
2009 when demand of natural gas in Brazil decreased due to the global economic crisis. 
Table 2. Well schedule and status 
Well Start of production Month # Status 
XX1 2001 9 Shut-in 
XX2 2001 2 Producing 
XX3 2001 1 Shut-in 
XX3R 2012 133 Producing 
XX4 2001 5 Producing 
XX5 2002 17 Producing 
XX6 2004 47 Producing 
XX7 2011 121 Producing 
XX8 2012 136 Producing 
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Arps (1945) decline curve analysis (DCA) was performed in a per well basis using the 
monthly production data until 2012 (Appendix C). Using the Arps equations and the 
least squares method, a fit was obtained for the parameters qi, Di and b. The results were 
not satisfactory. Some wells do not show any decline and others only have a few months 
of data. Subsequently, the regression fit was performed for the aggregated production of 
the field using the last 34 months of data which correspond to the decline phase as seen 
in Figure 15. The historic match was done for both natural gas (Figure 16) and 
associated NGL (Figure 17) separately to independently account for the reduction in the 
ratio gas and liquid production.  
 
Figure 16. Decline curve analysis regression fit for natural gas production using the 
last 34 months of available data 
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Figure 17. Decline curve analysis regression fit for natural gas production using the 
last 34 months of available data 
The regression fit values of the three parameters of the hyperbolic production forecast 
type curve are shown in Table 3. These parameters were used to construct production 
forecast type curves used later in this study (Figure 27, Section 5). 
Table 3. Arps decline fit parameters 
Parameter Natural Gas Condensate 
Qi 428,952 7,024 
Di 0.279 0.346 
b 0.676 0.654 
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CHAPTER IV  
FISCAL REGIMES AND PRICING MECHANISMS 
This section addresses two of the major factors that impact an oil and gas project’s 
profitability in Bolivia: the fiscal regime and the price determination methodology. This 
data will be an input for the cash flow model results of Section 5.  
4.1 Fiscal Regime Effectiveness: Generic 
Efficiency of a fiscal regime is typically evaluated using two economic indicators: the 
rate of return due the contractor, and the split of the NPV between the government and 
the contractor referred as government take and contractor take (Demirmen 2010; 
Weijermars 2016). A 10 % discount rate is commonly used in the oil and gas industry in 
estimations of NPV based on future values of cash flows. Different price scenarios and 
field development plans are tested, while properly accounting ruling fiscal system 
conditions.   
In order to achieve efficiency when profitability of the project improves due to price 
variation, or unexpected productivity or field size, a tax can be linked to the rate of 
return on investment or the R factor which is the ratio of the contractor’s cumulative 
revenue to the cumulative cost.   
A poor design could lead to the government wanting to revise the fiscal system when 
there is an unexpected bonanza, or an economic loss for the company in a negative 
scenario. The contractor prefers stability in contracts, and a revision in the middle of the 
project will generate disincentives for future projects. Oil companies evaluate 
investments on explorations depending on a country’s geological conditions, political 
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stability, reliability of legal systems, existence of a market and infrastructure, and the 
fiscal system. A fiscal regime should be simple to apply, provide the conditions to 
encourage exploration, promote development of fields of different sizes taking into 
account their technical difficulty, and give equal economic benefits to the contractor and 
the government (Demirmen 2010). Fiscal regimes should be designed to achieve a win-
win situation between them, with an adequate rent for the first and a rate of return on 
investment commensurate with project risks for the second. In an efficient fiscal regime, 
the NPV of the contractor before the government take honors the NPV after its take 
(Mian 2011). Another way to assess the attractiveness of a fiscal system is by the 
attributes of certainty, clarity, efficiency, equity, flexibility, neutrality, risk sharing, 
profit sharing and transparency (Abdul Manaf et al 2016). 
4.2 Fiscal Regimes and Contracts for Hydrocarbon Activities in Bolivia 
Bolivia has had many changes in legislation concerning hydrocarbon exploration and 
exploitation. In the past 30 years, three major hydrocarbon laws have been passed by the 
Bolivian Congress: Law 1194 in 1990, Law 1689 in 1996, and Law 3058 in 2005. 
Congress also issued the Supreme Decree 28701, known as the nationalization decree, in 
2006. The key subjects of modifications were the type of contracts to be signed between 
Bolivia and International Oil Companies, the fiscal system, the participation of the 
Bolivian National Oil Company, and the hydrocarbon price determination. In this study, 
the principal focus will be on the legislation valid in 2000 and onwards. A summary 
graph of the fiscal regime history of Bolivia is given in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Fiscal regime history in Bolivia (1990-Present) 
 
The principal fiscal rules are briefly outlined below. 
Law 1689 (CNB 1996) introduced the Contract of Sharing Risk, which in practice 
represents a concessionary system contract. This type of contract replaced the former 
Contract of Operation and Contract of Association stipulated in Law 1194. For this type 
of contract, the IOC was responsible for all investments and risks in the exploration 
phase. Once a discovery was made, the NOC would reimburse part of the investments 
according to its participation in the contract, if any. The IOC was free to commercialize 
its production to the market of their choice. 
Law 3058 (CNB, 2005) re-introduced the contracts of operation and association, and 
replaced the risk sharing contract for a production sharing contract (PSC). Companies 
that were already operating before this law was issued were forced to sign contracts 
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under these new conditions which were classified as operation contracts. Forty-four of 
this type of contract were signed in October 2006. In practice, they are a combination of 
a PSC and an operation contract: the investments made by the company are refunded 
once the discovery is made like a PSC contract, but the contractor share is given in 
money like an operation contract and the resource property remains national. Companies 
have the right of part of the production, but no ownership meaning that IOCs can’t book 
proven reserves (Ghandi and Lin, 2014). The second type of current contract is the 
service contract for exploration and exploitation introduced by the Resolution of the 
Ministry 150-10 in 2010 (Paz and Ramirez, 2013). For this case, after the discovery of 
hydrocarbons and the declaration of commerciality, a joint venture between YPFB and 
the contractor must be created, where the NOC remains as the major stakeholder. All 
rights and obligations are transferred to the newly formed company.  
 Law 1689 differentiated the fiscal system between existing and new hydrocarbons. 
Existing hydrocarbons were the ones discovered and certified before 30 April 1996. 
Companies extracting these existing hydrocarbons were subject to pay the taxes and 
royalties shown in Table 4. The taxable base was the production at wellhead minus the 
transportation costs: 
Table 4. Fiscal system for existing hydrocarbons (Adapted from Law 1689, 1996) 
Royalty or Tax Percentage 
Producing Province Royalty 11% 
Compensatory Province Royalty 1% 
National Tax (wellhead production) 19% 
Complementary National Royalty 13% 
NOC and National Treasury 6% 
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The new hydrocarbons were subject to the taxes and royalties shown in Table 5. The 
taxable base was the production at wellhead except for the surtax and national taxes. 
Table 5. Fiscal system for new hydrocarbons (Adapted from Law 1689, 1996). 
Royalty or Tax Percentage 
Producing Province Royalty 11% 
Compensatory Province Royalty 1% 
NOC and National Treasury 6% 
Other national taxes (Indirect) Variable 
The other national taxes included the following: 
 Profit tax (IUE) of 25% whose taxable base were the profits made by the
company 
 Remittance tax (IRUE) of 12.5% on the money sent overseas
 Surtax of 25% on extra-ordinary profits which were to be defined in the contract
 Value added tax (VAT) of 13% applied only to sales in the domestic market.
 Transaction tax (IT) of 3%, applied to sales in the domestic market.
The profit tax could be deducted from the payments of royalties, capital costs (a 
deduction for depreciation), and previous losses. The surtax taxable base was the value 
at wellhead. The company could deduct up to 33% of cumulative investments that 
cannot be transferred to other years, and 45% of the value of production at wellhead per 
field with a limit of Bs. 250 million. This amount was updated according to inflation and 
the exchange rate in comparison with the U.S dollar. Law 3058 introduced the Direct 
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Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH in Spanish) of 32% on the gross production at wellhead. The 
new fiscal system is shown in Table 6.  
Table 6. Current fiscal system for hydrocarbon exploitation (Adapted from Law 
3058, 2005) 
Royalty or Tax Percentage 
Producing Province Royalty 11% 
Compensatory Province Royalty 1% 
NOC and National Treasury 6% 
National Tax 32% 
Other national taxes Variable 
YPFB Participation* (DS 28701) Variable 
Decree Supreme 28701 (CNB 2006) required an additional participation of the National 
Oil Company (YPFB) of 32% on the gross production of gas fields that had an average 
production higher than 100 MMscfd in 2005. In practice this was not the case: YPFB 
participation is defined in the contract based on the production flow rate and the ratio of 
the cumulative revenue and the cumulative cost, called the B factor. The greater the B 
factor, the more participation YPFB is entitled to. The B factor tables for the San Alberto 
field can be found in Appendix B. 
Law 707 was issued in 2015. It creates an incentive for oil and condensate production 
(Law 707, 2015). The incentive depends on the type of fluid produced (oil or 
condensate), if production is coming from a new or old field, and whether the field is in 
the Traditional or Non-Traditional zone (Table 7). This incentive goes only to 
production directed to the domestic market. The law creates the Fund of Incentives to 
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Hydrocarbon Exploitation and Exploration which consists of 12 % of the Direct Tax on 
Hydrocarbon.  
Table 7. Incentives according to type of fluid and zone (Adapted from Law 767, 
2015) 
Type of fluid Price/Incentive 
Traditional Zone Non-Traditional Zone 
Incentive 
Inferior 
limt 
Incentive 
Superior 
limt 
Incentive 
Inferior 
limt 
Incentive 
Superior 
limt 
Oil 
Oil Price ($/bbl) 116 20.35 116 20.35 
Incentive ($/bbl) 30 50 35 55 
Condensate 
Oil Price ($/bbl) 106.29 27.11 106.29 27.11 
Incentive ($/bbl) 30 50 35 55 
Additional 
Condensate 
Oil Price ($/bbl) 74 27.11   
Incentive ($/bbl) 0 30   
 
In addition, the Bolivian Government has issued reforms to provide a better environment 
for IOCs to operate in Bolivia. 
 DS 2298 was issued in March 2015. It changes the legislation concerning the 
rights of direct consultation to indigenous communities regarding hydrocarbon 
exploitation activities. The decree modifies the schedule of the consultation in 
order to accelerate the process. 
 DS 2366 was issued May 2015. The decree authorizes hydrocarbon activities in 
environmental protected areas, with industry’s best practices to prevent and 
mitigate the environmental impact. 
 40 
 
 DS 2549, October 2015, more areas reserved for YPFB, no bidding process, 
direct negotiations and contract awarding.  
4.3 Natural Gas Pricing Mechanisms, Generic 
Natural gas prices are usually determined by the market, the price of a competing fuel 
(usually oil), or regulated by the government. IGU (2016) classifies the mechanisms into 
8 categories; the 3 that concern this study are listed below: 
a) Oil Price Escalation (OPE). The natural gas price is linked to competing fuels 
through a base price or escalation clause. The competing fuels are usually oil, gas 
oil or fuel oil. 
b) Gas-on-Gas Competition (GOG). The natural gas price is determined by the 
market (supply and demand). It is traded at physical hubs or notional hubs. Gas 
can be bought and sold on a short term basis and long term basis which is usually 
included in contracts using these prices instead of competing fuel prices. Spot 
LNG is included in this category. 
c) Regulation: Social and Political (RSP). The price is determined by a regulatory 
entity of the government on a social/political basis, usually to cover increasing 
costs.  
From 2005 to 2015, the pipeline and LNG imports price in the global market has 
increasingly been determined by GOG at the expense of the OPE mechanism.  
In Latin America, GOG has risen mainly due to spot LNG imports in Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile. The OPE mechanism still represents the largest portion in the Latin American 
market, accounting for 28% of the total consumption (IGU, 2016).  
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4.4 Natural Gas Pricing Mechanisms in Bolivia 
The natural gas prices in Bolivia are determined by the weighted average of the natural 
gas prices for each market (e.g. domestic, Brazilian exports and Argentinian exports) in 
both legislation periods. The domestic market has fixed prices for the industrial, 
commercial and residential use, while the prices for Brazil and Argentina are stipulated 
in each contract and are indexed to a basket of fuel oils (Appendix A). Hence, the 
weighted average gas price depends on the participation of each market over the total 
production and the WTI price. The historical gas prices for the export markets and WTI 
oil prices are available for the period 1999-2016 (Figure 19).  
 
Figure 19. Historical natural gas and oil prices (Adapted from YPFB and EIA, 
2016) 
 
The underlying correlation between the WTI oil price and export prices to Brazil and 
Argentina can be modeled. Using the historical data, a linear regression (Figure 20) was 
performed for each contract in order to determine future prices (Section 4.5). The 
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correlation coefficient (R2) is 0.85 for the Argentinian contract, and 0.88 for the 
Brazilian contract. 
𝑃𝐺,𝐴𝑟𝑔 = 0.1077 ∗ 𝑊𝑇𝐼 − 0.4264 Eq. 4.1 
 
𝑃𝐺,𝐵𝑟 = 0.0796 ∗ 𝑊𝑇𝐼 − 0.2915 Eq. 4.2 
  
Figure 20. Correlations between gas prices and WTI oil price a) Argentina b) 
Brazil 
  
As for oil, in the period 1996-2006, the prices were given by an average of a basket of 
oil prices. In this document, the WTI price is used due to lack of data of the oils 
considered in that basket. In the current legislation, the oil price for the domestic market 
is fixed at a price of 27.11 $/bbl before taxes. 
4.5  Future Price Scenarios of Oil and Natural Gas 
Oil prices have been characterized by being volatile. In recent years, the WTI price has 
varied from a maximum of $140 per barrel in June 2008 to $26 per barrel in February 
2016 (EIA, 2016). To account for the volatility of the prices, five WTI oil price 
scenarios were considered (Figure 21). The scenarios reach prices of 40, 60, 80, 100, and 
120 US dollars per barrel in 2020 and stay constant for the remaining life of the field.  
 43 
 
 
Figure 21. WTI historical prices and forecast for different price scenarios 
 
Based on the oil price scenarios, the linked gas prices for the Argentinian (Figure 22) 
and Brazilian (Figure 23) markets were calculated using Figure 21. The price 
determination methodology relies on the weighted average of the real prices to the 
domestic, Brazilian and Argentinian markets. The domestic gas price is regulated, in 
2014-2017 the gas price rounded $1.1/MMBTU (MEH, 2017); this study assumes this 
constant price for the future.  
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Figure 22. Natural gas historical prices and forecast for different price scenarios to 
Brazil 
 
The price scenarios of Figure 22 and Figure 23 will be used as input for the economic 
analysis of Section 5 and perform a price sensitivity analysis. 
 
 
Figure 23. Natural gas historical prices and forecast for different price scenarios to 
Argentina 
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CHAPTER V  
INPUTS AND FISCAL SCHEDULES FOR ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF 
REPRESENTATIVE MEGA-FIELD 
In this section, the methodology to calculate the Net Present Value, Government Take 
and Contractor Take for the studied mega-field are given under different fiscal schedules 
based on hydrocarbon and tax legislation, and previous work by Medinaceli (2007) on 
Bolivian fiscal regimes. The results will be used to evaluate the fiscal regime, the 
stakeholder’s interest and the profitability of the representative mega-field for the 
contractor. 
A common industry measure for the profitability of field projects is the Net Present Value 
of Future Vales (𝐹𝑉𝑡) at 10% discount rate and the rate of return (IRR) of the contractor. 
They were calculated using equations 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = ∑
𝐹𝑉𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
Eq. 5.1 
∑
𝐹𝑉𝑡
(1 + 𝐼𝑅𝑅)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
= 0    → 𝐼𝑅𝑅  
Eq. 5.2 
In order to evaluate the impact of the incentives law for possible future investments, the 
NPV and the expected monetary value (EMV) for the company were calculated. An 
investment with an EMV (Eq.5.3) greater than 0 is considered acceptable. 
𝐸𝑀𝑉 = ∑ 𝑁𝑃𝑉 ∗ 𝑃(𝑁𝑃𝑉)
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
Eq. 5.3 
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In order to compute the net cash flows the applicable tax regime needs to be properly 
accounted for, which for the production period of the field comprises two periods of 
fiscal regimes: Period 1 (2001-2006) and Period 2 (2007 onwards), and an additional 
incentive (2015 onward). These fiscal schedules are described in detail below. 
5.1 Fiscal Schedule for Economic Analysis: Period 1 (2001-2006) 
As described in Section 4.2, the fiscal regime for oil and gas activities was ruled by Law 
1689 during the initial production period (2001-2006) of the mega-field. The 
concessionary system defines two sources of income for the government: royalties to the 
gross revenues of natural gas sales, and indirect taxes. The workflow to obtain the 
contractor take, government take and their cash flow under Law 1689 is shown in Figure 
24. Each step is further explained afterwards. The symbols used are explained in Table 
8. 
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Figure 24. Cash flow workflow scheme: Period 2001-2006 (Modified from Mian, 
2012) 
 
  The gross revenues are calculated by multiplying the gas and condensate 
volumes by the price of each hydrocarbon. 
𝐺𝑅 = (𝑃𝐺 ∗ 𝑉𝐺) + (𝑃𝐶 ∗ 𝑉𝐶) Eq. 5.4 
The natural gas price is the weighted average of the price of each market and it 
accounts for the cost of transportation to the domestic and foreign markets. 
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𝑃𝐺 =
((𝑃𝐺,𝐵𝑟 − 𝑇𝐺,𝐸𝑥) ∗ 𝑉𝐺,𝐵𝑟) + ((𝑃𝐺,𝐴𝑟 − 𝑇𝐺,𝐸𝑥) ∗ 𝑉𝐺,𝐴𝑟) + ((𝑃𝐺,𝐷 − 𝑇𝐺,𝐷) ∗ 𝑉𝐺,𝐷)
𝑉𝐺
 
 
 Eq. 5.5 
The condensate price was in function of a basket of oil prices. Due to the 
unavailability of these historical data, WTI oil prices were considered in this study. 
𝑃𝐶 = 𝑃𝐶,𝐷 − 𝑇𝐶 Eq. 5.6 
  The royalties are obtained by multiplying the royalty rates by the gross 
revenues. 
𝑅𝑜 = 𝐺𝑅 ∗ (𝜏𝑃 + 𝜏𝑌) Eq. 5.7 
  The net revenues is the subtraction of the royalties from the gross revenues. 
𝑁𝑅 = 𝐺𝑅 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑅) Eq. 5.8 
 A portion of the revenues is used for operational expenses, investments, 
depreciation and other monthly expenses, referred as deductions. 
 The taxable income is the subtraction of the net revenue minus the monthly 
expenses for the tax on profits (IUE), on remittances (IRUE). The taxable income 
for the value-added tax (VAT) and the transactions tax (IT) are the revenue of the 
sales of all the hydrocarbons directed to the domestic market. 
Each of them is calculated with the following equations: 
𝑇𝑖 = 𝑉𝐴𝑇 + 𝐼𝑇 + 𝐼𝑈𝐸 + 𝐼𝑅𝑈𝐸 + 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥 Eq. 5.9 
 
𝐼𝑈𝐸 = 𝜏𝐼𝑈𝐸 ∗ (𝑁𝑅𝑡 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖 − 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑌𝑃 − 𝑌𝑃𝐹𝐵𝑡) Eq. 5.10 
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𝐼𝑅𝑈𝐸 = 𝜏𝐼𝑅𝑈𝐸 ∗ (𝑁𝑅𝑡 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖 − 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑌𝑃𝐹𝐵𝑡 − 𝐼𝑈𝐸𝑡 − 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡) Eq. 5.11 
The surtax has the same taxable base as the Tax on Profits. Nevertheless, two 
additional deductions can be made: 45% of the value of the production at the 
wellhead or $50 million (whichever is lowest), and the cumulative investment for 
the second time up to 33% per year. 
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥 = 𝜏𝐼𝑈𝐸 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝑡 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖 − 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑌𝑃 − 𝑁𝑂𝐶𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡 − 𝐷𝑇 ∗) Eq. 5.12 
The value-added tax (VAT) and the transaction tax (IT) are only applicable to sales 
for the domestic market. 
𝑉𝐴𝑇 = 𝜏𝑉𝐴𝑇 ∗
(𝑃𝐺,𝐷 − 𝑇𝐺,𝐷) ∗ 𝑉𝐺,𝐷
𝑉𝐺,𝑇
∗ 𝑉𝐺 
Eq. 5.13 
 
𝐼𝑇 = 𝜏𝐼𝑈𝐸 ∗
(𝑃𝐺,𝐷 − 𝑇𝐺,𝐷) ∗ 𝑉𝐺,𝐷
𝑉𝐺,𝑇
∗ 𝑉𝐺 
Eq. 5.14 
 The net cash flow for the contractor is: 
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑐 = (𝑅𝑅𝑡 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖 − 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑌𝑃 − 𝑇𝑖) Eq. 5.15 
Whereas the net cash flow for the government is: 
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑔 = 𝑅𝑜 + 𝑇𝑖 Eq. 5.16 
 The government and contractor take is the portion of the combined net cash 
flow each party takes: 
𝐺𝑇 =
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑔
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑔 + 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑐
 
Eq. 5.17 
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𝐶𝑇 =
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑐
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑐 + 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑔
Eq. 5.18 
5.2 Fiscal Schedule for Economic Analysis: Period 2 (2007 onwards). 
During the period 2007 onwards, the fiscal regime was ruled by Law 3058. The system 
migrated to a mix of a service and a production sharing contract, creating new sources of 
revenue for the government: an extra Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons and a participation of 
the NOC. The workflow to obtain the contractor take, government take and their cash 
flow under Law 3058 is shown in Figure 25. Each step is further explained afterwards. 
The symbols used are explained in Table 8. 
Figure 25. Cash flow workflow scheme: Period 2007 onwards (Modified from Mian, 
2012) 
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 The gross revenue is calculated as in the period 2001-2007 (Eq. 4.3) except 
for the condensate price which is fixed for this period at 27.11 $/bbl. 
 Royalties are calculated with the same equation as for the period 2001-2007 
(Eq. 4.4) 
 The National Tax on Hydrocarbons is applied on the gross revenues as the 
royalties: 
𝐼𝐷𝐻 = 𝐺𝑅 ∗ (𝜏𝐼𝐷𝐻) Eq. 5.19 
  The Recoverable Costs are defined as the costs, both direct and indirect, that 
the company incurred for operating and exploiting the field; they are subdivided 
into exploration, development and exploitation costs. Each field has a limit of costs 
that can be recovered stipulated in the contract. National taxes are also recoverable 
but they do not include the royalties, national tax on hydrocarbons (IDH), and the 
Tax on Profits (IUE). The limit of the recoverable costs is set to 60% of the Net 
Revenue for this contract. 
𝑅𝐶𝑡 = min{𝑅𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥 + 𝐷&𝐴 + 𝐼𝑇 + 𝐶𝐴 , 𝐿𝑅𝐶 ∗ (𝑅𝑅 − 𝑇𝑇)} Eq. 5.20 
If the costs are not covered, they are cumulative for the next month. 
𝑅𝐺𝑡 = max{𝑅𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥 + 𝐷&𝐴 + 𝐼𝑇 + 𝐶𝐴 − (𝐿𝑅𝐶 ∗ (𝑅𝑅 − 𝑇𝑇)), 0} Eq. 5.21 
 The Profit Gas results from the subtraction of the net revenues minus the 
recoverable costs.  
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 The distribution of the profit gas depends on the B factor and the flow rate 
(an example of the table can be seen in Appendix B). The B factor is calculated 
monthly based on the ratio of the cumulative depreciation and revenue of the 
contractor and the cumulative investments and taxes paid that were not considered 
for the recoverable costs. 
𝐵𝑡 =
𝐷&𝐴0 + ∑ 𝐷&𝐴𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=1
𝐶𝐼0 + ∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=1
         
Eq. 5.22 
The participation of YPFB is extracted from the table with the B factor and the 
flow rate (Appendix B). 
𝑌𝑃𝐹𝐵 = 𝜏𝑌𝑃𝐹𝐵 ∗ (𝐺𝑅 − 𝑅𝑜 − 𝑅𝐶) Eq. 5.23 
 Where: 
𝜏𝑌𝑃𝐹𝐵 𝑓(𝐵𝑡, 𝑞) 
 And the contractor share of the profit gas is: 
𝐶𝑝 = (1 − 𝜏𝑌𝑃𝐹𝐵) ∗ (𝐺𝑅 − 𝑅𝑜 − 𝑅𝐶) Eq. 5.24 
   Both YPFB and the contractor pay the indirect taxes as for the period 
2001-2007 except for the surtax which was eliminated. 
 The Net Cash Flow for the contractor will be the recoverable costs plus the 
share of profit gas minus the indirect taxes. 
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑔 = 𝐶𝑅 + 𝐶𝑝 − 𝑇𝑖,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 Eq. 5.25 
 The Net Cash Flow for the government will be: 
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑔 = 𝑇𝑖 + 𝐼𝐷𝐻 + 𝑌𝑃𝐹𝐵𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 Eq. 5.26 
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The participation of YPFB and the indirect taxes they pay are considered as part 
of the government share. 
 The Government and Contractor take are calculated as in the period 2001-
2007 
5.3 Fiscal Schedule for Economic Analysis of the Impact of the Incentives Law 
The incentives law issued in 2015 aims to encourage exploration and exploitation 
activities. For producing fields, the incentives apply to condensate or oil production, 
additional to the agreed volumes in the field development plan. The fiscal schedule 
shown in Figure 26 follows the system given by Law 3058 and the operation contracts 
but has two main differences: 12% of the national tax on hydrocarbons are retained by 
the government and directed to the incentives fund (Eq. 5.26), and the incentives for the 
additional production are added to the contractor profit share (Eq. 5.27). This means the 
incentives are not subject to royalties, the national tax on hydrocarbons, and YPFB share 
(this is an assumption of this study because of lack of access to the regulations of Law 
707 and Decree Supreme 2830). The symbols used are explained in Table 8. 
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Figure 26. Cash flow workflow scheme including incentives 
.   The incentive fund is given by eq. 5.27.         
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 12% ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝐻 Eq. 5.27 
 The incentives are calculated with equation 5.27 as defined by the Decree Supreme 
2830 
𝐼𝑡 = (−0.6398 ∗ 𝑊𝑇𝐼𝑡 + 47.345) ∗ 𝑄𝑡
27.11 < 𝑊𝑇𝐼𝑡 < 74 
30 > 𝑃𝑖 > 0 
Eq. 5.28 
The symbols and units used in Section 5.1 and 5.2 are shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Symbols used for the economic analysis in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 
Item Abbreviation Unit 
Natural Gas Price (Total, Brazil, Argentina, 
domestic) 
𝑃𝐺 , 𝑃𝐺,𝐵𝑟 , 𝑃𝐺,𝐴𝑟 , 𝑃𝐺,𝐷 $/MMBTU 
Gas Transport Fee (Exports, domestic) 𝑇𝐺,𝐸𝑥, 𝑇𝐺,𝐷 $/Mscf 
Gas volume (Total, Brazil, Argentina, 
domestic) 
𝑉𝐺 , 𝑉𝐺,𝐵𝑟 , 𝑉𝐺,𝐴𝑟 , 𝑉𝐺,𝐷 MMscfd 
Calorific value  𝐶𝑉 MMBTU/Mscf 
Royalties 𝑅𝑜 $ 
Royalty Rate 𝜏𝑅 (%) 
Gross Revenues GR $ 
Net Revenues NR $ 
National Production Tax Rate 𝜏𝐼𝐷𝐻 (%) 
Capital Expenditure Capex $ 
Operational Expenditure Opex $ 
Depreciation and Amortization D&A $ 
Recoverable Costs RC $ 
Cumulative Recoverable Costs RG $ 
Indirect Taxes 𝑇𝑖 $ 
Value-Added Tax Rate 𝜏𝑉𝐴𝑇 (%) 
Transaction Tax Rate 𝜏𝐼𝑇 (%) 
Profit Tax Rate 𝜏𝐼𝑈𝐸 (%) 
Remittance Tax Rate 𝜏𝐼𝑅𝑈𝐸 (%) 
B Factor B - 
YPFB Share YPFB ($) 
YPFB Share Percentage 𝜏𝑌𝑃𝐹𝐵 (%) 
Produced volume (Gas, Condensate, Water) 𝑉𝐺 , 𝑉𝐶 , 𝑉𝑊 MMscfd 
Use of Land fee 𝐿𝐹 $bs/ha 
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(Table 8 Continued) 
Item Abbreviation Unit 
Area of contract A ha 
Net Present Value NPV $ 
Yearly discount rate r % 
Internal Rate of Return IRR % 
Limit Recoverable Costs 𝐿𝑅𝐶 % 
Abandonment costs 𝐶𝐴 $ 
Incentives 𝐼𝑡 $ 
Price given by incentives 𝑃𝑖 $/bbl 
Condensate production subject to incentives 𝑄𝑡 bbl 
5.4 Additional Input 
a) Hydrocarbon Volumes.
Historical values for the natural gas and condensate flow rates are used for the 
period 2001-2016. For future production of natural gas and condensate, the 
production forecast was made based on the decline curve analysis of Section 3.3 
(Figure 27). 
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Figure 27. Natural gas and condensate production profile 
The historic gas-condensate ratio and the future estimate based on the decline 
curve analysis of section 3.3 is shown in Figure 28. 
Figure 28. Gas-condensate ratio for the life-cycle of the field showing historic values 
and the estimated future ratios based on the production forecast 
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b) Pricing. Equation 5.5 determines that the natural gas price will be the weighted 
average of the gas price and volume directed to each market. The demand 
scenarios of Section 2.6 provide these volumes which are used to determine the 
future prices (Figure 29). The difference of the gas prices given by the demand 
scenario start at 2% and reach 7% by 2029 for the highest price scenario due to 
the greater participation of domestic gas demand and the assumed reduction in 
half of the Brazilian contract beyond 2019. The high demand scenario is taken as 
the base for the economic analysis assuming that Brazil will continue to buy 
similar gas volumes after the finalization of the current contract. 
 
Figure 29. Future weighted natural gas price for the low and high demand scenario 
for all gas price scenarios considered in section 4.5 
 
c) Capital Expenditure (Capex) and Operation Expenditure (Opex) used in the cash 
flow analysis are based on approximate data for the studied field as shown in 
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Table 9. Input data for Capex include expenditures for drilling and completing 
wells, tie-ins, processing plants and pipelines. Throughout the project, nine wells 
were drilled. The tie-in pipelines total 37 km with a diameter of 6 inches. The gas 
treatment processing plant is divided into two modules with a combined capacity 
of 13.5 MMm3/d. 
Table 9. Capital and operational expenditures 
Concept Cost Unit 
D&C Costs 35 million $/well 
Tie In and Pipelines 40,000 $/inch/km 
Processing Plant 130 million $ 
d) Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization
Depreciation is calculated with the straight line method. The useful life of different 
items is detailed in Table 10. Depletion and Amortization are not considered. 
Table 10. Years of useful life for depreciation purposes 
Concept Years of useful lfe 
Wells 5 
Tie-in 5 
Processing Plant 8 
Pipelines 10 
e) Royalties and Direct Taxes
Royalties and Direct Taxes are defined according to Law 1689 and Law 3058 
detailed in Section 2.2 and summarized in Table 11. These rates are applied to the 
Gross Revenues of the sale of gas. 
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Table 11. Summary of royalties and direct taxes 
Royalty/Tax Law 1689 Law 3058 
Province Royalty 11% 11% 
Compensatory Royalty 1% 1% 
National Treasury/NOC 6% 6% 
National Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH) 0 32% 
f) Patents
The patents are a fee for the use of the land under contract. Table 12 shows the 
amount to be paid per year. The area of contract of San Alberto is 14,012.43 
hectares. Historic exchange rates were used in the cash flow analysis for 2001-2016 
(BCB, 2016) and the future exchange rate is assumed to be Bs. 6.96 per dollar. 
Table 12. Land-use patents for Laws 1189 and 3058 
Period 
Patents (Bs./hectare) 
Law 1189 Law 3058 
1st -3rd  year 2.5 4.93 
4th -5th  year 5 9.86 
6th -7th  year 10 19.71 
8th  year and onwards 20 39.42 
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CHAPTER VI  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION FOR MEGA-FIELD ANALYSIS 
6.1 Evaluation of the Fiscal Regime Impact on NPV Distribution: 2001-2016 
The effects of the two fiscal regimes on the NPV distribution in 2001-2016, were 
compared for both the contractor and government perspective. The two fiscal regimes 
are ruled by Law 1389 (2001-2006) and Law 3058 (2007-2016), see Section 4.2. The 
results are estimations made by the author and are approximations of the actual NPV 
distribution and revenues. In 2001-2006, the government take NPV was rounded 56% 
and the contractor take 44% (Figure 30).  
 
Figure 30. Contractor take and government take in 2001-2006 under Law 1389 and 
a contract of shared risk 
 
The government principal sources of income were royalties (40.45%) and the Profit Tax 
(35.44%) as detailed in Figure 31. The value-added tax, the transaction tax, and 
remittance tax accounted for the other 25.11%. It is worth noting that the surtax on 
extraordinary profits was not active during this period.  
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Figure 31. Government take distribution showing the tax breakdown in 2001-2006 
 
In 2007-2016, the government take NPV was 87.82% and the contractor take NPV was 
12.18%, representing a variation of more than 30% in favor of the government compared 
to the previous period (Figure 32).  
 
Figure 32. Contractor take and government take in 2007-2016 under Law 3058 and 
a contract of operation 
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The government income came from royalties (the direct tax on hydrocarbons was 
included in this category) accounting for nearly 70% (Figure 33). The share of the 
national oil company YPFB was 22.45% representing the second source of income for 
the government in order of importance. The added-value tax, the remittance tax and the 
transaction tax accounted for approximately 8%, all play a minor role in the government 
take than in the previous period.     
 
Figure 33. Government take distribution showing the tax breakdown in 2007-2016 
 
The fixed taxes and royalties are applied to the gross revenue of natural gas sales, and 
increased to more than 70% of the NPV share, making the fiscal system regressive 
(taxing does not account for profitability of the project), and renders the contractor 
susceptible to operational losses.    
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6.2  Forward Economics, Contractor and Government Take under Different Price 
Scenarios (2016-2029) 
This section performs an economic evaluation for the field life cycle of the studied 
mega-field (2001-2029) under the different price scenario defined in Section 4.  
The undiscounted NPV for the contractor is $940 million for the $40/bbl price scenario 
and $1,200 million for the $120/bbl price scenario, only representing a 27% increase in 
NPV. This can be explained by the increasing government take in the later years of the 
project. On the other hand, the undiscounted NPV for the government is $7,386 million 
for the $40/bbl price scenario, and $9,296 million for the $120/bbl price scenario, 
accounting for a 26% increase. The government take in the future (2016-2029) is 
estimated at 97% for the $40/bbl scenario and it stabilizes at 90% for the other price 
scenarios (Figure 34).     
 
Figure 34. Contractor take and government take under different price scenarios in 
the period 2016 onwards 
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The increasing government take is related to the conditions that define the share of 
YPFB (Appendix B). YPFB’s share of the profit gas grows as the cumulative profits of 
the contractor increases and the production flow rate decreases. This creates a setting 
where the contractor share of the profit gas gradually decreases in the late life of the 
field.  
The rate of return of the contractor is not heavily affected by the future income (Figure 
35). The IRR ranges from 17.7% and 18.1%. The low variation for the IRR can be 
explained by the greater dependence of the IRR on the early years of the project and the 
lower revenues for the contractor starting from 2007.  
 
Figure 35. Contractor undiscounted NPV, NPV10 and IRR under different price 
scenarios 
 
As seen in the field’s cash flow breakdown, the contractor take NPV does not increase 
commensurate to the extra revenues (See Appendix D, Figures 39-43) coming from the 
favorable price scenarios; the government takes it mostly through YPFB’s share. This 
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phenomenon is highlighted in Figure 36: the monthly contractor take steadily increases 
as the gas price rises does until the B factor triggers YPFB share and causes a drop in the 
contractor share. The higher price scenario suffers the drop first as the B factor grows 
faster as cumulative earnings are higher (Appendix B).    
 
Figure 36. Monthly contractor take under different price scenarios showing the 
effect of the YPFB share 
   
Future revenues will follow the trend of the past period and have an average distribution 
of 90 and 10 % for the government and the contractor, respectively. Figure 37 shows the 
cumulative contractor and government take under different price scenarios, and 
illustrates the legislation changes and the dimension of the NPV distribution. In the early 
field life (2001-2006), the cumulative NPV of the contractor and government grew at 
similar rates. However, in the second period (2007-2014), the government take grew 
considerably (Figure 37, upper curve) because of the new fiscal system, higher 
commodity prices and increasing production. In 2015-2016, we see that the rising trend 
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in government take flattens off because oil prices fell and production rates decreased. 
From 2017 onwards, the government take is more sensible to price changes than the 
contractor take (Figure 37).     
 
Figure 37. Cumulative contractor take and government ake for the entire life of the 
field under different price scenarios 
 
6.3 Economic Impact of the Incentives Law on EMV 
This section evaluates if drilling infill wells in the  mega-field is profitable for the 
company under different price scenarios and the impact of the incentives law on this 
decision. Only the $40/bbl and $60/bbl scenarios will be impacted by the incentives 
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because of the range limits of the Incentives Law of $27 to $74/bbl oil price (Section 
5.3). 
EMV was calculated with the following expression: 
𝐸𝑀𝑉 = (𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒)
+ (𝑁𝑃𝑉 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑
− 𝑁𝑃𝑉 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) 
In the period between 2015 and 2019, YPFB (2014b) expects 3 wells to be drilled in this 
field. An economic analysis using NPV and EMV was performed to assess whether 
drilling any new wells would be profitable for the company under different price 
scenarios. The study analyzes the feasibility of the first well in San Alberto. The initial 
production rate of the first new well was predicted to be 30 MMscfd and the annual 
decline rate of the field was set at 7.8% by YPFB (2014b). This study assumes the well 
first month of production is January 2017. Three drilling well costs scenarios were 
considered: the average of the past wells of $35 million, $50 million and a maximum of 
$70 million.  
In 2006-2014, out of 138 developments wells drilled, 117 were positive and 21 were 
negative (ANH, 2015). Taking this historical data, the probability of failure of a 
development well rounds 18%. 
The EMV for the $40/bbl scenario is negative at this probability of failure (Figure 38a). 
Nevertheless, with the incentives the EMV becomes positive making the project feasible. 
The EMV for the $60/bbl scenario is positive at an 18% probability of failure. The EMV 
for the rest of the scenarios is positive at 18% and are not benefited by the incentives. 
 69 
 
  
Figure 38. Expected monetary value vs probability of failure under different price 
scenarios from the contractor's perspective for a well drilling cost of a) $35 million 
b) $50 million and c) $70 million 
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The results for a $50 million well cost is similar to the $35 million case. The EMV for 
the $40/bbl scenario is negative without incentives and becomes positive with them 
(Figure 38b). Similarly, the EMV for the $60/bbl case is positive with and without 
incentives. The case of a well cost of $70 million has a negative EMV for price scenarios 
of $40/bbl and $60/bbl and they become positive with the incentives at 18% probability 
of failure (Figure 38c). 
6.4 Decision Making and Sub-conclusion about the Incentives Law 
The incentives fund which collects 12% of the National Tax on Hydrocarbons (Table 
13). For the studied field, $64 million are collected by the government for a $40/bbl and 
$90 million for a $60/bbl. 
Table 13. Available incentives fund for different price scenarios 
Price Scenario Available Incentives Fund 
$40/bbl $64,679,470 
$60/bbl $90,590,780 
In comparison, Table 14 shows the disbursed incentives to the contractor and the 
contractor and government NPV take of the revenues generated if the well is a producer. 
The incentives disbursed to the contractor for the $40/bbl scenario are approximately 
$22 million that can be covered by the incentives fund generated by the San Alberto 
field. The government revenues of the production from the additional well is $181 
million. Under the $60/bbl scenario, the incentives to the company are $11 million, 
amount fully covered by the fund generated from the field which is $90 million, and the 
government revenue coming from the additional well is $282 million. 
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Table 14. Disbursed incentives to the contractor, contractor and government take 
for different price scenarios for the new well 
Price Scenario 
Incentives to 
company 
Contractor NPV Government NPV 
$40/bbl $22,458,531 $25,078,680 $181,343,910 
$60/bbl $11,396,235 $22,067,148 $282,717,043 
 
With this analysis, we can conclude that the Incentives Law provides good outcomes for 
both the company and the contractor: it gives the contractor enough incentives to make 
drilling profitable at different price scenarios and generates an extra revenue for the 
government much higher than the disbursed incentives to the company. 
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CHAPTER VIII  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The change of fiscal regime in the Bolivian hydrocarbon sector in 2005-2006 ruled by 
Hydrocarbon Law 3058 made a big impact on revenue distribution between the 
government and the contractor. In the San Alberto mega-field, this study’s estimations 
show that the average government take increased from 56% (2001-2006) to 88% (2007 
onward). Despite the reduction of the contractor take, the economic return for the 
contractor shows an IRR rounding 18%, given by the higher contractor share of the 
previous system ruled by Law 1689 and the rise of the commodity prices in 2005-2014. 
In the present scenario of lower commodity prices, the decline phase of the field and an 
increasing government take through the YPFB variable share, the economics of the field 
are not so attractive for the company. The future government take averages 90% for all 
price scenarios, the only exception being the $40/bbl. case which reaches a government 
take of 96%. The higher government take of the lowest price scenario considered in this 
study can be explained by the fact that the contractor takes losses during several months 
because of the high B factor and the cost recovery limit of 60%.  
The efforts of the government to encourage exploration and exploitation activities 
through the Incentives Law of 2015 prove to be efficient for the mega-field case based 
on the evaluation of the contractor’s EMV for drilling one additional well. For the 
average drilling cost of $35 million of past wells and a historic probability of success of 
82% for development wells in Bolivia, the EMV of the $40/bbl price scenario is negative 
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without incentives but becomes positive with the implementation of the incentives. The 
other considered price scenarios ($60, $80, $100, $120/bbl) result in positive EMVs.  
The planned wells in the mega-fields will be key to preventing the looming gap between 
gas supply and demand in the short-term and will give extra time to discover and 
develop new hydrocarbon resources. Based on the study’s results, the author suggests 
that in this new scenario of production decline and lower commodity prices, efforts need 
to be made to make E&P activities attractive for the contractor. While the incentives are 
a step in that direction, they also add another item to an already complicated fiscal 
system.       
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF THE BOLIVIAN GAS SALE AGREEMENTS WITH 
BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA  
Some more details of the Gas Sale Agreements with Brazil and Argentina are given in this 
Appendix. The price formulas show the correlation with the Fuel Oils, and ultimately the 
WTI oil price. The contractual volumes and clauses were the basis for the demand 
scenarios.  
A.1 GAS SALE AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL 
Period: 1999-2019 
Duration: 20 years.  
Price Determination: OPE method 
The gas price formula to Brazil is: 
𝑃𝐺,𝐵𝑟 = 𝑃(𝑖) ∗ (0.5 ∗ 𝐹𝑂1 + 0.25𝐹𝑂2 + 0.25 ∗ 𝐹𝑂3) 
Where: 
𝑃𝐺,𝐵𝑟= Gas price (US$/MMBTU) 
𝑃(𝑖)= Base price (US$/MMBTU) 
𝐹𝑂1= Fuel Oil Cargoes FOB Med Basis Italy of 3.5% S2 (US$/ton) 
𝐹𝑂2= Fuel Oil US Gulf Coast Waterborne of 1 % S2 (US$/bbl) 
𝐹𝑂3= Fuel Oil Cargoes FOB NWE of 1% S2 (US$/ton) 
The prices of the fuel oils are the arithmetic averages of the daily prices’ inferior and 
superior limits, published by Platt’s Oilgram Price Report. 
The price for the second trimester and onwards is calculated as the average of the current 
and prior trimesters: 
79 
𝑃𝐺,𝐵𝑟 = 0.5 ∗ 𝑃𝐺(𝑖),𝐵𝑟 + 0.5 ∗ 𝑃𝐺(𝑖−1),𝐵𝑟 
Volumes and base price values 
Table 15. Contractual natural gas quantities (MMm3/d) and base prices 
($/MMBTU)-Brazil 
Year 
Total Flow 
Rate 
Base Flow 
Rate 
Added 
Flow Rate 
Price Base 
Flow 
Price Added 
Flow 
1999 8 8 0 0.95 1.2 
2000 9.1 9.1 0 0.95 1.2 
2001 13.3 10.3 3 0.95 1.2 
2002 20.4 11.4 9 0.95 1.2 
2003 24.76 12.6 12 0.96 1.2 
2004 30.08 13.7 16.38 0.96 1.2 
2005 30.08 14.9 15.18 0.97 1.2 
2006 30.08 16 14.08 0.98 1.2 
2007 30.08 16 14.08 0.98 1.2 
2008 30.08 16 14.08 0.99 1.2 
2009 30.08 16 14.08 1 1.2 
2010 30.08 16 14.08 1 1.2 
2011 30.08 16 14.08 1.01 1.2 
2012 30.08 16 14.08 1.02 1.2 
2013 30.08 16 14.08 1.02 1.2 
2014 30.08 16 14.08 1.03 1.2 
2015 30.08 16 14.08 1.03 1.2 
2016 30.08 16 14.08 1.04 1.2 
2017 30.08 16 14.08 1.05 1.2 
2018 30.08 16 14.08 1.05 1.2 
2019 30.08 16 14.08 1.06 1.2 
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A.2 GAS SALE AGREEMENT WITH ARGENTINA 
Period: 2007-2027 
Duration: 20 years.  
Price Determination: OPE method 
Gas price formula for gas deliveries to Argentina 
𝑃𝐺,𝐴𝑟𝑔 = 𝑃𝑏 ∗ (0.2 ∗
𝐹𝑂11
𝐹𝑂10
+ 0.25
𝐹𝑂21
𝐹𝑂20
+ 0.25 ∗
𝐹𝑂31
𝐹𝑂30
+ 0.25 ∗
𝐷𝑂1
𝐷𝑂0
) 
Where: 
𝑃𝐺,𝐴𝑟𝑔= Gas price Argentina (US$/MMBTU) 
𝑃𝑏 = Base price (US$/MMBTU) 
𝐹𝑂11= Fuel Oil Cargoes FOB Med Basis Italy of 3.5% S2 (US$/ton) 
𝐹𝑂21= Fuel Oil No 6, 6 API, US Gulf Coast Waterborne of 1 % S2 (US$/bbl) 
𝐹𝑂31= Fuel Oil Cargoes FOB NWE of 1% S2 (US$/ton) 
𝐷𝑂1= US Diesel, US Gulf Coast Waterborne (USc$/USgal) 
The prices of the diesel and fuel oils (𝐹𝑂11, 𝐹𝑂21, 𝐹𝑂31, 𝐷𝑂1)  are the arithmetic 
averages of the daily prices’ inferior and superior limits of the semester prior to the 
trimester that is being calculated. The daily prices are the ones published on Platt’s 
Oilgram Price Report. 
The prices of the diesel and fuel oils (𝐹𝑂10, 𝐹𝑂20, 𝐹𝑂30, 𝐷𝑂0)  are the arithmetic 
averages of the daily prices’ inferior and superior limits of the period between January 
1st, 2004 and June 30th, 2006. The base price was calculated so that the final price would 
be 5$/MMBTU in the first trimester of 2007. 
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Volumes 
The contractual base volumes, and the ones corresponding to the clauses Take or Pay 
(ToP) and Deliver and Pay (DoP) are in Table A.2.1. 
Table 16. Contractual natural gas quantities to Argentina (MMm3/d) 
Year Period CDC DOP TOP 
2010 
Winter 7.7 5 5 
Summer 7.7 5 5 
2011 
Winter 11.3 7.7 7.7 
Summer 11.3 7.7 5.7 
2012 
Winter 13.6 11.6 11.6 
Summer 13.6 11.6 10.4 
2013 
Winter 15.9 13.5 13.5 
Summer 15.9 13.5 10.4 
2014 
Winter 19 16.2 16.2 
Summer 19 16.2 12 
2015 
Winter 20.7 17.6 17.6 
Summer 20.7 17.6 14.5 
2016 
Winter 23.4 19.9 19.9 
Summer 23.4 19.9 16.4 
2017 
Winter 23.9 20.3 20.3 
Summer 23.9 20.3 16.7 
2018 
Winter 24.6 20.9 20.9 
Summer 24.6 20.9 17.2 
2019 
Winter 25.1 21.3 21.3 
Summer 25.1 21.3 17.6 
2020 
Winter 25.7 21.8 21.8 
Summer 25.7 21.8 18 
2021 
Winter 27.7 23.5 23.5 
Summer 27.7 23.5 19.4 
2022 
Winter 27.7 23.5 23.5 
Summer 27.7 23.5 19.4 
2023 
Winter 27.7 23.5 23.5 
Summer 27.7 23.5 19.4 
2024 
Winter 27.7 23.5 23.5 
Summer 27.7 23.5 19.4 
2025 
Winter 27.7 23.5 23.5 
Summer 27.7 23.5 19.4 
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Year Period CDC DOP TOP 
2026 
Winter 27.7 23.5 23.5 
Summer 27.7 23.5 19.4 
2027 
Winter 27.7 23.5 23.5 
Summer 27.7 23.5 19.4 
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APPENDIX B: YPFB PARTICIPATION TABLES 
One major source of income for the government in the current fiscal regime comes from 
the share of the profit gas that the national oil company takes. Appendix H of the 
operation contracts indicates the YPFB share of the profit gas which depends on the B 
factor (cumulative earnings and depreciation divided by cumulative investments and 
taxes not accounted on the cost recovery) and the production rate. 
Table 17. Example of YPFB participation table for natural gas prices 
Q 
(MPC/d) 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7
0 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.54
176575 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.51
240142 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.48
303709 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.45
367276 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.42
430843 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36 0.39
494410 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36
557977 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33
621544 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3
685111 0 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27
b for P<=2.65USD/MMBTU
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APPENDIX C. DECLINE CURVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS IN A PER WELL 
BASIS 
This section contains the equations used to find the Arps parameters and the results of 
the regression in a per well basis used in Section 3. The regression of the Arps 
parameters allow us to obtain a production forecast which represents a key input for the 
economic model. 
The regression to obtain the Arps parameters was done in Excel. Monthly and 
cumulative production is available. The model compares the cumulative production data 
to the one calculated with equation C.2 The solver tool of Excel is used in order to 
minimize the difference between the calculated Np and the real Np varying the Arps 
parameters (least square method). 
𝑞 = 𝑞𝑖 ∗ (1 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑡)
(−
1
𝑏) 
Eq. C.1 
𝑁𝑃 =
𝑞𝑖
𝑏
(1 − 𝑏) ∗ 𝐷𝑖
∗ 𝑞𝑖
1−𝑏 − 𝑞1−𝑏 
Eq. C.2 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑(𝑁𝑝,𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑁𝑝,𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)
2
 
Eq. C.3 
 
Parameter Units 
qi Volume units/day 
Di 1/year 
b dimensionless 
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Table 18. Decline curve analysis fit and parameters – Well XX2   
 
Arps values 
Qi 94570 
Di 0.145 
b 5 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 19. Decline curve analysis fit and parameters – Well XX4 
 
Arps values 
Qi 120804 
Di 0.171 
b 1.755 
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Table 20. Decline curve analysis fit and parameters – Well XX5 
Arps values 
Qi 90212 
Di 0.377 
b 4.078 
Table 21. Decline curve analysis fit and parameters – Well XX6 
Arps values 
Qi 65210 
Di 0.314 
b 1.634 
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APPENDIX D: CASH FLOW BREAKDOWN FOR THE ENTIRE FIELD LIFE 
UNDER DIFFERENT PRICE SCENARIOS 
This appendix shows the breakdown of the cash flow under different price scenarios, 
detailing the share of the CAPEX, OPEX, royalties, indirect taxes, YPFB share and the 
contractor share. It can be seen that for future operations (2016 onwards), the contractor 
take does not increase in the same magnitude as the revenues. Through YPFB share, the 
government collects a big portion of the price uptake.  
 
 
Figure 39. Cash flow breakdown of the project for the 40$/bbl price scenario 
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Figure 40. Cash flow breakdown of the project for the 60$/bbl price scenario 
Figure 41. Cash flow breakdown of the project for the 80$/bbl price scenario 
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Figure 42. Cash flow breakdown of the project for the 100$/bbl price scenario 
 
 
Figure 43. Cash flow breakdown of the project for the 120$/bbl price scenario 
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APPENDIX E: DATA MANAGEMENT  
All work produced and data used in this document was properly preserved in a data 
management system which contains all codes, sources, presentations, and data so that 
this study can be reproduced or expanded by students in the research group. The data 
management diagram is shown in Figure 44 
 
Figure 44. Data management diagram. 
